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“The Highest Limit of Statesmanship”
Ritterian Geography and Russian Exploration of the Amur River Basin, 1849–1853
Sharyl Corrado
Abstract: The lower Amur River basin was annexed by Russia in the mid-nineteenth century
following several years of unauthorized exploration by naval officer Gennadii Nevel’skoi.
Scholars recognize multiple factors—geopolitical, economic, and nationalist—that prompted
Russia’s interest in the region. This article adds to this list the budding science of geography, and
in particular, the influence of German geographer Karl Ritter. To Ritter, a nation’s true borders
were set by nature, not by man. His ideas are reflected in both the words and actions of
Nevel’skoi regarding the lower Amur basin. The explorer described the territory not as foreign or
other, but as naturally, historically, and rightfully Russian land. The river, to him, was a
highway, facilitating transport through Siberia. In time, even the tsar was convinced. Ritter’s
ideas extended far beyond intellectual circles in Russia, serving to at once guide and justify
Russia’s eastward expansion.
Keywords: Amur, colonialism, Gennadii Nevel’skoi, geographic determinism, imperial
expansion, Karl Ritter, Russian Far East
After nearly a decade of mediating between the insubordinate naval officer Gennadii Ivanovich
Nevel’skoi and the tsar’s conservative-leaning Council of Ministers, East Siberian Governor
General Nikolai Nikolaevich Murav’ev successfully negotiated the Treaty of Aigun with Chinese
Prince I-Shan in 1858, awarding the left bank of the Amur River to Russia and the right bank to
China, adding more than 600,000 km2 to the Russian Empire. Two years later in Beijing, Russian
envoy Nikolai Ignat’ev negotiated a second treaty that not only confirmed the conditions agreed
upon at Aigun but also granted to Russia the entire lower Amur River basin and the maritime
region east of the Ussuri River, a total of 910,000 km2. By order of Murav’ev, in the summer of
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1860, the Russian flag was raised on the shore of the Golden Horn Bay on the southern end of
the Ussuri region, the newly founded post given the name Vladivostok, or “Ruler of the East.”
For his accomplishments, Murav’ev was granted the title of Count and the honorific surname
Amurskii. 1
Russian attention to the Amur River basin in the mid-nineteenth century was motivated
by a variety of factors. As John J. Stephan outlines, initial interest was primarily for geopolitical
reasons, as the 1842 British victory in the First Opium War had granted Great Britain a foothold
in East Asia. 2 Aleksandr I. Alekseev emphasizes the growing number of American whaling ships
plying the waters of the Sea of Okhotsk and periodically pillaging indigenous settlements as
well, arousing concern in St. Petersburg. 3 As Mark Bassin demonstrates, burgeoning nationalism
also motivated Russian eastward expansion, as nationalists drew attention to the country’s
unique position in both Europe and Asia and saw in the Amur River the potential to transform
Siberia into a rich and fertile land. 4 Moreover, this was an era of imperialism worldwide, and
along with the Amur region, Russia sought to secure the Caucasus and Central Asia as its own.
Flowing eastward from East Siberia, the Amur River could serve as a highway connecting
valuable Siberian resources with new markets on the Pacific. By the mid-1850s, the state was
actively preparing the region for settlement.
This essay points to an additional factor shaping Russia’s acquisition of the lower Amur
River basin: the ideas of the prominent German scholar Carl Ritter, professor of geography at the
University of Berlin, applied to Russia by members of the Imperial Russian Geographical
Society and other educated Russians of the period. At a time when Romantic Nationalism
pervaded European thought, educated Russians sought to define Russian identity both
prescriptively and descriptively, looking at not only cultural factors, such as religion and
ethnography, but at geography and the nation’s physical environment as well. According to Carl
Ritter, both individuals and nations (peoples) “exist under the influence of nature,” “every
organism form[ed] in accordance with its inner nature and its modifying surroundings.” 5
Patriotic Russian advocates of the scholar’s “new geography,” therefore, faced a dilemma: how
to explain Russia’s imperial expansion without departing from Ritter’s concept of an organic
homeland. Yet even as scholars debated these concepts in the Russian capitals, Gennadii
Nevel’skoi implemented them practically in the Far East. Applying Ritter’s geographic
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determinism to Russia, Nevel’skoi was able to colonize without viewing himself as imperialistic,
to claim vast territories for the empire while claiming they had been Russian all along.
Widely regarded as the father of modern historical and cultural geography, Karl Ritter
was a household name among the educated classes of Europe and Russia by the mid-nineteenth
century. Not only had he reinvented the field of geography, but he had influenced scholars in
countless other fields as well. An ever-growing number of Russians attended his lectures in
Berlin, and Russian translations of his works began appearing as early as the 1820s. By the early
1840s, he was often referred to in the Russian popular press as “renowned” and “genius.” 6 It
was, in part, thanks to Ritter, who devoted 19 volumes to Asia, that Russia experienced a revival
in the study of Siberia in the mid-nineteenth century. 7
The influence of Ritter was evident among many prominent Russian scholars. Those
influenced directly by Ritter include Moscow University historians Timofei Granovskii and
Mikhail Pogodin, both of whom appropriated from the geographer the importance of geography
as the foundation of history. While Pogodin actively promoted translation of Ritter’s works into
Russian, Granovskii’s popular lectures introduced Ritter to Russian society. 8 A student of
Granovskii and successor of Pogodin at Moscow University, the prominent historian Sergei
Solov’ev spread the German geographer’s geographic determinism in his multi-volume History
of Russia since Ancient Times, 9 teaching that nature determined the natural boundaries of the
state. 10 The renowned geographer’s emphasis on the interconnections between all aspects of the
universe inspired Konstantin Arsen’ev to propose a “universal geography” that synthesized the
sub-disciplines of mathematical, physical, and political geography. 11 Ritter’s emphasis on the
role of geography in the realization of the nation’s destiny inspired the foundation of the Russian
Geographical Society.
It is no surprise that geographic science was employed in service of the Russian empire.
By the mid- to late nineteenth century, colonization—like many aspects of society and politics—
had become a scientific endeavor. No longer were intellectual pursuits regarded as impractical
occupations advancing knowledge for its own sake. They had become tools applied in the service
of Russia itself. Natural scientists were cataloging the empire’s flora, fauna, climate, and
terrain. 12 In the empire’s Pacific Northeast, imperial officials heeded naturalists’ warnings
regarding the pending extinction of sea creatures. 13 Ethnographers studied the peoples of the
empire. 14 Demographic data was gathered in an effort to regulate population density and direct
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peasant resettlement. 15 Writing from the recently annexed southern Ussuri territory, explorer
Nikolai Przheval’skii appealed in the late 1860s for “correct colonization [pravil’naia
kolonizatsiia], based on data from science and experience.” 16
Asian Russia played an ambiguous role within the Russian Empire as both a remote
colony and an extension of Russia itself. To many Russians, Siberia was to Russia what India
was to Britain—a foreign territorial possession with valuable resources desirable to the state. 17
As such, Siberia was governed by a General-Gubernator (Governor General), a position
modeled after that of the British Governor General over India. Yet Siberia was more than simply
a distant, if valuable, colony. Siberia was also Russia’s frontier, a land gradually settled by
Russians, holding much in common with the American West. 18 Moreover, not all Russians
viewed Siberia as different or other. As Claudia Weiss demonstrates, Siberia was “mentally
appropriated” by Russians through the writings of key members of the Russian intelligentsia
exiled to Siberia on political grounds. 19 Ilya Vinkovetsky stretches the realm of imagined
Russianness even further, showing how Russian America came to be perceived by Russian elites
as “mentally much closer to Russia than the bulk of Siberia,” due to the introduction of regular
around-the-world voyages. 20 To populist writers such as Nikolai Nekrasov and Fedor
Dostoevsky, Asian Russia was in some ways better than European Russia, representing the
potential for Russian rebirth. 21 Indeed, by the early twentieth century, historian Vasilii
Kliuchevskii described Russia’s eastward expansion in both Europe and Siberia as a process of
Russia “colonizing itself.” 22
Close attention to the writings of insubordinate naval officer Gennadii Nevel’skoi reveals
noticeable similarities between the views of the Russian explorer and those of the foreign
geographer and his Russian admirers, suggesting that Ritter’s influence extended far beyond the
realm of ideas. While Ritter devoted two volumes to northeast Asia alone, even more important
was the shift in perspective that he introduced to scholarship and society. No longer was
geography limited to a collection of facts about the Earth’s surface, serving the advancement of
knowledge alone. Ritter emphasized the influence of the natural environment on the course of
history, including the political and economic development of mankind, and urged the application
of geographical knowledge in service of the state. In his memoirs, published in 1876, Nevel’skoi
cited the geographer directly, describing Russia’s lost opportunity in the seventeenth century to
establish a “rich granary” at the “farthest border of Asia”—an enterprise that failed through no
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fault of their own. 23 Yet, as an educated Russian of the mid-nineteenth century, the naval officer
was undoubtedly familiar with the basic tenets of Ritterian thought even before his departure.
From the very beginning, Nevel’skoi viewed his exploration as not aimed at the advancement of
science alone, but in service to Russia itself. Both the motivations and methods of his exploration
correspond to ideas introduced by the explorer and developed further by his Russian followers.
A New Geography
While geographers in the past had gathered facts and descriptions as an end in themselves, to
Karl Ritter, the Earth was a complex, organic whole made up of interdependent parts. In his 19volume Geography [Erdkunde] in Relation to the Nature and History of Mankind (1817–1859),
Ritter sought not only to integrate the natural sciences but also to demonstrate “the relation of
Nature to History, of the Country to its People, and in special of the Individual to the Globe.” A
pious man, he attributed to geography a determining effect on the development of societies, the
physical environment serving as a tool through which divine purposes are implemented on Earth.
The Earth’s natural features, Ritter explained, were designed in the interests of its human
inhabitants. As Ritter explained in the introduction to his masterwork, both “man as an
individual, and…nations…cannot attain to perfect harmony with themselves before they find
their true place to live and develop what is in them.” While in the past, this interrelationship
between man and nature may have gone unnoticed, “in these our times, the law which controls
this harmony…must be sought with all the aids which science gives.” 24
Of particular significance in Russia was Ritter’s view of the nation and its corresponding
political state. At a time when national consciousness was emerging throughout Europe, Ritter
argued that the characteristics of nations—die Völker—were in part determined by their natural
environment. Nature exercises great influence on nations, he asserted, describing an influence
that “has everywhere and at all times penetrated to the very heart of history.” “Nations, like
men,” Ritter explained in his introduction to Erkunde, “are formed under a law superior to
themselves….Every organism forms itself in accordance with its inner nature and its modifying
surroundings, and thus the formula of its existence is read in the law imposed on it and in the
mould in which it is found.” He predicted that one day scientists would decipher those laws
through the study of a nation’s natural environment, thereby uncovering the most desirable
course of that nation’s development. Furthermore, the scientists would determine measures to
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take in order to ensure the welfare of the nation as ordained by Providence. Such an act, he
asserted, was “the highest limit of statesmanship.” Only when a nation occupied its “true place”
in the world would harmony emerge between the land and the people, politics and philosophy,
and nature and the state, ensuring “through the course of history, prosperity and renown to
peoples and states.” 25 As politically ordained boundaries had changed regularly over time, Ritter
asserted that “for a true system of scientific geography, the statement of the area of political
divisions does not suffice; that of the divisions marked out by nature itself…must be first
ascertained,” the divisions that create nations, and at times, states. 26
Ritter granted particular importance to the study of history, which to him was inseparable
from geography. Historical phenomena and geographical features, he wrote in 1818, constituted
a “natural unity,” explaining that “nature”—by which he meant the entirety of all things—existed
in both space and time. 27 At an 1833 speech at the Royal Academy of Sciences in Berlin, the
geographer explained further: “Areas, times, shapes, and forms…do not remain the same in their
relation to the globe, viewed as the dwelling place of mankind, rather they truly change their
relative values with the progress of centuries and millennia.” 28 The Earth operated according to
laws of geography that conditioned the development of both people nations, some “more
favourably situated for progress than others.” 29 Ritter emphasized, however, that the influence of
nature was waning with the development of technology, as distances “which were once regarded
as almost untraversable, are now readily traversed by the aid of sails and steam.” 30 It was “the
task of the geographer…to discover what causes have exerted a promotive or retarding influence
on the various forms of the globe and their development hitherto.” 31 Ritter’s seminal 1833 article
on this topic, “The Historical Element in Geographical Science,” was published in Russian in
1836. 32
Ritter’s direct influence in Russia is most evident within the Russian Geographical
Society, founded in 1845 by men who shared Ritter’s nationalistic vision of promoting
knowledge of the nation’s land and its inhabitants. 33 Rather than focusing on knowledge for its
own sake, the newly formed Geographical Society existed to serve the homeland itself, to “direct
all efforts toward the benefit of Russia, devoting them primarily to the study of the Russian land
and the Russian people”—a goal not unlike Ritter’s call for scholars to apply their geographical
knowledge in service of the nation. 34 In 1846, Ritter was named an honorary member of the
Geographical Society, and soon the Society commissioned translation of large portions of
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Ritter’s work into Russian. 35 Many of the society’s Baltic German founders, including explorers
Fedor Litke (Friedrich Lütke), Aleksandr Middendorf (Alexander von Middendorff), Ferdinand
Vrangel’ (Ferdinand von Wrangel), and Karl Baer (Karl von Baer), advocated for Ritter’s new
geography within the Society, even as Ritter cited their work in his 19-volume Erdkunde. 36
Ritter’s influence was spread in Russia through a small book published by the Society in 1848
aimed at reaching a broad audience. Along with other works influenced by the German
geographer was included an article by Karl Ber on the influence of natural features on nations
and on human history, documenting the role of rivers as connectors and the capacity of other
geographic features to form boundaries, facilitating the development of both nations (narodov)
and states (gosudarstv). 37 Even after the Society’s ethnically German founders were replaced by
Russian leaders in 1849, Ritter’s influence remained strong. Society member and explorer Petr
Semenov, later to become Vice-chairman of the Society, attended Ritter’s lectures in Berlin, and
the Society continued the ongoing project of translating Erdkunde into Russian. Like nationalists
throughout Europe, the Society prioritized the organic borders of the Russian nation over those
of an artificially created state, and members of the Society were often at odds with the
conservative politics of Tsar Nicholas I.
A key distinction emerged, however, between the teachings of the master himself, and
those of his Russian followers. To Ritter, God had created the natural world in a manner that
enabled the growth of pre-ordained cultures, civilizations, peoples, and states. However,
development in these areas was not predestined by fate. Man had a moral obligation to seek
knowledge of the world and to make proper use of the possibilities granted through nature by
God himself. To Ritter, nature shaped mankind’s development but did not determine his ultimate
fate. 38 In Russia, however, fatalism predominated among Ritter’s followers. Baer emphasized
that “even today, when accomplishments in the fields of science and industry have provided man
with many tools with which to subjugate nature, the course of human development is still subject
to that same inescapable fate [as determined at the creation of the world].” 39 Solov’ev likewise
claimed that nature determines inevitable state boundaries, and that it is therefore futile to oppose
them. 40
While the geographer primarily described his observations on the interrelations between
man and nature, his followers did not hesitate to apply his ideas prescriptively, as indeed Ritter
had predicted. 41 By the mid-nineteenth century, ideas once articulated by Ritter had found direct
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application to Russia itself. In 1843, Baron August von Haxthausen undertook a year-long
voyage throughout the Russian empire, establishing broad contacts with Russian scholars and
introducing them to the latest European scientific ideas. 42 The political unity of Russia,
Haxthausen asserted, was “intended by nature…[its lands] only capable when united of
constituting a powerful and independent state.” 43 Haxthausen cautioned, however, that Russia
could not “without injury to herself be a conquering power.” 44 This was no concern to historian
Mikhail Pogodin, who taught that all peoples of the Russian land would not only accept Russian
authority, but would themselves russify, and indeed wanted to do so. 45 Aleksandr Balasoglo, a
liberal young archivist at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and an early member of the Russian
Geographical Society, shared similar sentiments, claiming boldly in the mid-1840s that “the East
belongs to Russia immutably, naturally, historically, of its own free will.” 46 Balasoglo was soon
arrested for participation in the radical Petrashevsky circle, yet his influence lived on in a lengthy
memo he prepared for Nikolai Murav’ev upon the latter’s appointment as Governor General of
East Siberia. 47 In it, Balasoglo emphasized that East Siberia stretched naturally to the Pacific and
was part of a larger unified Russia. He described a flourishing Russian fur trade on the Amur in
the early seventeenth century—information likely gleaned from Ritter himself—and argued that
the land belonged rightfully and historically to Russia. 48 Consistent with Ritter’s theories that
nature created interdependent parts within an organic whole, Balasoglo considered it the
estestvennoe naznachenie (natural function) of the eastern borderlands to serve all of Russia. 49
“If Russia does not wish to recognize its treasures,” he warned the Governor General, “then
someone else will see them and take measures [to acquire them]! A holy place will not be
empty!” 50
The young historian Sergei Solov’ev, who became chair of Russian history at Moscow
University in 1845, was familiar with Ritter’s ideas through his teachers at the same university,
including his predecessor Mikhail Pogodin, his mentor Timofei Granovskii, and statistics
professor Aleksandr Chivilev. He himself attended the famous geographer’s lectures in Berlin in
1842. 51 In early 1850, Solov’ev published a short, yet important, article in the liberal literary
magazine Otechestvennye zapiski (Notes of the Fatherland), introducing themes that would
pervade his multi-volume history. Echoing Ritter, yet emphasizing strict geographic
determinism, Solov’ev wrote that what matters is not the size of a state but the manner in which
it came into being. If a large state comes into being through wars or treaties, Solov’ev explained,
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it cannot last, as nature itself will facilitate its division. If nature, on the other hand, designed vast
boundaries for a state from the beginning, the opposite would be true. “Sooner or later,”
Solov’ev wrote, “nature will take its own [priroda beret svoe]: despite all obstacles, artificially
separated parts will strive for unification and ultimately achieve their goal.” 52 Like Ritter, who
taught that it was the “harmony between people and country, this relation of the state to nature
and to the life of man, and so to politics and philosophy, which has given, through the course of
history, prosperity and renown to peoples and states,” 53 Solov’ev, too, maintained that a state
was strongest when it occupied its natural borders. Just as Americans at the time viewed their
westward expansion in terms of a “manifest destiny” to stretch to the sea, so Russian land,
Solov’ev argued, was an organic unit centered on the vast East European plain, which contained
no natural divisions. While many tribes had once co-existed in that immense territory, they were
unable to remain enemies for long. Their differences had been rapidly annihilated. 54
While Solov’ev located Russia solidly in Europe, detailing what he considered natural
expansion of pre-modern Russia along eastern European rivers, he noted that Russian expansion
even beyond Europe was facilitated by nature. Like Ritter, he viewed waterways as a means of
transportation. Acknowledging that mountains often divided people into nations, he explained
that in the Caucasus—which Russia had annexed earlier in the century—nature had “removed
the capacity [of the mountains] to divide” by surrounding them with water on two sides,
facilitating transportation within the region. 55 The Caucasus, therefore, had been easily taken by
Russians, as was Siberia, which had no natural divide between itself and European Russia.
“Because of their insignificant height,” he wrote in his 1850 article, the Urals “do not have the
divisive character of other mountain ranges,” a sentiment shared by Ritter, who described the
Urals as no longer a barrier, but a “medium of connection…between Europe and Asia.” 56
Likewise, the historian expanded upon the geographer’s narrative of how small tribes scattered
throughout Siberia had been unable to oppose natural Russian expansion, and soon the Russian
state had reached the shores of the Pacific. 57 While Solov’ev’s multi-volume history detailed premodern expansion that ended at the Urals, there was nothing to prevent further Russian
expansion into Asia. Indeed, his famous pupil, Vasilii Kliuchevskii, later described how modern
Russia did just that.58
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Imagining the Amur
By the 1840s, only the Amur River basin in southeastern Siberia remained free of Russia’s grasp,
cut off from even Siberia by the thick forests and high mountains of Zabaikal’e. While Russian
soldiers and traders had inhabited northeastern Siberia since the seventeenth century,
southeastern Siberia had seen few Russians in nearly 200 years. According to maps based on the
1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk, the territory was Chinese. Yet even this picture was beginning to
change, prominently challenged by Russian Geographical Society founder Aleksandr
Middendorf, an early Russian disciple of Ritter. In 1843, the famous explorer had undertaken his
own expedition to the Far East, assigned by the Russian Academy of Sciences to investigate
Siberian permafrost and the Sea of Okhotsk. Warned of the dangers of encroaching on Chinese
territory, Middendorf nonetheless disregarded orders and explored the Amur River as well. Like
Ritter, he believed that waterways were a natural means of communication and transport, their
watersheds dividing the Earth into natural units of territory. 59 This territory, he believed, was
rightfully Russian, rather than Chinese. To him, the Amur and its tributaries, flowing out of inner
Siberia, could not be disconnected from Russia itself. Since human settlement patterns followed
the waterways, Middendorf saw Russian expansion on both sides of the Amur as inevitable. 60 It
was the fate of Russia and the United States, Middendorf wrote in his travel report, to “look at
each other across the ocean as neighbors.” 61
On the Russian side of the Pacific, two factors were preventing the realization of
Middendorf’s vision. Perhaps most important were state concerns about relations with China,
with whom trade had suffered following the opening of treaty ports to the west. Hoping to avoid
conflict, Foreign Minister Karl Nessel’rode vehemently opposed exploration of the region, which
was designated Chinese on official Russian maps. 62 Secondly, the Amur River was presumed to
be unnavigable at its mouth, preventing it from facilitating transport to and from the Pacific. In
1846, a covert expedition had been dispatched in search of a navigable channel up the river.
When no such channel was located, the tsar declared the river “useless” and the question was
considered closed. 63 Further exploration was assumed to be both dangerous and unnecessary.
It was in this context that Gennadii Nevel’skoi gained interest in the Amur River basin. A
top graduate of the prestigious Naval College with 14 years of experience at sea, Nevel’skoi—
like Ritter—questioned the findings of past explorers. 64 In the mid-1840s, the officer began
meeting with Balasoglo, and together the two men planned a joint expedition in search of the
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river’s mouth. Balasoglo, they assumed, would travel through Siberia and down the Amur itself,
while Nevel’skoi would circumnavigate the globe to approach by sea. 65 When the opportunity
arose to command an around-the-world voyage delivering supplies to Kamchatka, Nevel’skoi
volunteered for the assignment, proposing to Naval Minister Aleksandr Menshikov to explore
the Amur estuary as well. If all went well, he would meet Balasoglo there. Neither Balasoglo’s
subsequent arrest nor the rejection of his proposal by the Minister of the Navy daunted
Nevel’skoi, who set sail in August of 1848.
Nevel’skoi and Balasoglo were not the only ones to recognize the potential value of the
Amur to Russia. The explorer is unlikely to have embarked on his unsanctioned exploration were
it not for the support of Nikolai Murav’ev, who had been appointed Governor General of East
Siberia in 1847. Having studied Balasoglo’s lengthy memorandum on East Siberian history and
geography, Murav’ev was well aware of the geopolitical significance of the region to Russia. He
knew that Russian Cossacks had traded along the Amur in the seventeenth century, until they
were forced out by the Manchu. He found a kindred spirit in Nevel’skoi, and soon Murav’ev
became Nevel’skoi’s primary supporter. Before his departure, Nevel’skoi wrote to his friend, “is
it possible that such a vast river as the Amur would fail to carve an outlet into the sea, and would
instead get lost in the sand, as it somehow seems based on the aforementioned briefs?” 66 If
navigable, the river would not only serve Russia as a natural highway but also render Siberia
vulnerable from the east. If Nevel’skoi was right, Russia would be forced to defend the land as
its own. From Rio de Janeiro that November, Nevel’skoi wrote to Murav’ev that he was on
schedule and expected to continue to the Amur as planned, although he still lacked approval
from St. Petersburg. Aware of the potential consequences of his anticipated insubordination, he
asked the governor to approach the tsar on his behalf. 67
When Nevel’skoi arrived in Kamchatka in May of 1849, he did not wait for word from
St. Petersburg, although instructions had, in fact, been dispatched by courier across Siberia.
Instead, he departed immediately for the Amur. After nearly two months of exploration,
Nevel’skoi confirmed what he had suspected all along. The mouth of the Amur was not only
navigable, he ascertained, but was accessible from both the north and the south. What previous
explorers referred to as the Gulf of Tatary, a body of water south of the Amur estuary,
Nevel’skoi found to be a strait, providing direct access from the Amur River to China and Japan.
Both Nevel’skoi and Murav’ev rejoiced at this discovery, convinced that the region would prove
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of great significance to Russia. 68 Murav’ev wrote to Naval Minister Menshikov, “The most
important of all [Nevel’skoi’s] discoveries is the southern strait from the liman [estuary] and the
unblocked entrance it provides for even the largest ships from the Gulf of Tatary directly into the
river. This discovery forces us to proceed immediately with the occupation of the mouth of the
Amur.” 69
While they did not immediately claim the land as Russian or send ships to defend it,
Nevel’skoi’s discovery convinced St. Petersburg officials of the political and military
significance of the Amur. Soon the state approved further exploration, although still undercover
and limited in scope. Nevel’skoi was to establish a post to the north of the river but not to
approach the river itself. 70 A year later, he was assigned a crew of 60 men and granted a position
as officer on special assignment to Murav’ev himself. Until 1855, Nevel’skoi remained in the
region exploring the territory, establishing forts, trading with the area’s indigenous inhabitants,
and proclaiming the territory Russian land. As in the past, much of his activity was conducted
without the approval of the tsar.
Ritterian Geography Applied in the East
While to the state in the latter half of the 1850s, Russian exploration and fortification of the
region was primarily a defensive measure, Nevel’skoi’s activity in the first half of the decade,
along with the language he used later to describe it, reveal the influence of Ritter and his
followers not merely on an intellectual level among the Russian intelligentsia but also in very
practical ways on the distant frontier. Just as Ritter had predicted that one day scholars would
understand the laws of nature and implement them to benefit the nation, Nevel’skoi put Ritter’s
words into practice when he explored the Amur basin, claimed it for Russia, and defended his
actions to statesmen in the capital. Having studied the geography of the region in preparation for
his travels, it is no surprise that the officer was familiar with Ritter’s volumes on northeastern
Asia. Indeed, in his memoir, he referenced the geographer directly, referring to the “rich
granary” the region could have become for Russia, had the seventeenth-century Cossacks made
proper use of it. 71 It is likely that both Nevel’skoi and Murav’ev were familiar with more than
just the sections of Erdkunde relevant to the Amur, however. Both men were well-educated and
Western-leaning, and both were involved in the Russian Geographical Society. Moreover, during
his 10 years in the Baltic Fleet, Nevel’skoi served under Fedor Litke, a key figure behind the
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Russian Geographical Society’s translation of Ritter’s work into Russian. He was likely familiar
with the 1848 book by the Russian Geographical Society, which popularized Ritter’s ideas
among a wider Russian audience. 72
Nevel’skoi and Murav’ev may have also been familiar with Solov’ev’s application of
Ritter to the Russian state. 73 Solov’ev’s crucial initial article laying out the relationship between
the natural environment and the historical development of the Russian state was published in
February of 1850 in the liberal literary magazine Otechestvennye zapiski (Notes of the
Fatherland). 74 Both men were in St. Petersburg at that time, reporting on Nevel’skoi’s findings
and explaining the significance of the Amur basin to the tsar and his advisors. Moreover,
Murav’ev almost certainly had access to the journal at his home in Irkutsk, and there is evidence
that Nevel’skoi shared some issues of the magazine with his officers in the Far East. 75 While
neither man cited the historian directly, Solov’ev contributed significantly to the intellectual
climate of the time, which shaped the narrative through which the men explained Nevel’skoi’s
undertaking and pronounced Russia’s destiny in the east. 76
Certain key similarities are discernible between Ritter’s—and Solov’ev’s—theoretical
understanding of national borders and the explorer’s claims on the Far Eastern lands. To Ritter,
rivers were “the great veins of the earth,” whose pulsation “conduces to the activity of the human
race, and calls states and nations forth, and stamps them with conscious individuality.” 77
Historically, he asserted, the districts formed by watersheds were “the home of culture and the
seat of organized political states.” Such states developed naturally, and could not easily be split
apart. 78 As Karl Baer explained to the Russian public, “the influence of [the earth’s natural
features] is seen in the division of people into groups with natural borders and the development
through them of nations and states.” 79 Likewise, to Solov’ev, waterways were crucial to a state’s
natural expansion, and in that area Russia was exceptionally well-endowed. Russia’s river
systems, according to Solov’ev’s narrative of pre-modern Russian history, served as guides to
the early populations. Tribes settled along rivers, and the first cities developed along them. 80
Navigable waterways enabled the unity of both the people and the state. Solov’ev portrayed
Russian history as a series of migrations along river routes, all converging on the Moscow River,
which he deemed the state’s natural center. 81 While Solov’ev focused on pre-modern Russia,
however, Ritter emphasized the even greater connective function assumed by rivers in the
modern era. “The waters of the continents, the colossal rivers, have lost their former length” he

13

wrote in 1833. “They are practically shortened six or seven fold; and whereas they used to be
navigable only in one direction, except with the greatest difficulty, their current is now almost as
readily stemmed as followed.” 82
As a seaman, Nevel’skoi, too, viewed water as a means of transportation, as a connector
rather than a divide. While his interest in the Amur originated due to its geo-politically strategic
location, he soon came to describe it as Russia’s destiny to expand along the Amur. What made
the river Russian, according to Nevel’skoi and Murav’ev, reflecting the influence of Balasoglo,
was its origin deep in Siberia, which itself was connected by rivers to Russia’s European
heartland. Demonstrating the nationalism of the era and the ethos of the Russian Geographical
Society, Nevel’skoi emphasized that his actions were in the service of the fatherland
(otechestvo). His discovery of the navigability of the river’s mouth, Nevel’skoi explained in his
memoir, “proved the great importance of the Amur River as an artery, connecting East Siberia
with the ocean, which had previously been considered separated by tundra, mountains, and huge
empty spaces.” 83 These views were shared by Lieutenant-Commander Voin Rimskii-Korsakov,
who piloted the first ocean-going vessel through the Strait of Tatary in 1853. Rimskii-Korsakov
wrote not of the military or geopolitical significance of the region—although he certainly
grasped this, serving on a diplomatic mission to Japan. Rather, echoing Balasoglo and
Haxthausen, who emphasized the economic interdependence of regions within a naturally
ordained state, he wrote of the Amur basin as an integral part of an organic Russian land, without
which the entire body would suffer. “Thank God that attention is now being paid to this land,”
Rimskii-Korsakov wrote from the East. “It alone can bring life to our Siberia and supply the
resources it needs by means of the Amur.” 84 Possessing the eastern borderlands of the natural
Russian homeland would strengthen the state as a whole.
When Nevel’skoi claimed the Amur River basin as rightfully Russian in the 1850s, he
demonstrated similarity in particular to Solov’ev by declaring not only a Russian future for the
region but also a Russian past. While Ritter viewed the shifting of state and national borders as a
natural and even teleological process, 85 to Solov’ev, such movement signified a departure from
the organic territory in which the nation belonged. Yet, in a country as large as Russia, organic
territorial borders seldom coincided completely with the actual boundaries of the state. “As a
result of historical conditions,” Solov’ev explained, “many Russian regions were torn away by
foreign powers; but nature itself resisted this artificial separation. [For example,] Poland was
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unable to tear apart southwestern Rus from northeastern [Rus].” 86 Solov’ev was confident that
territory artificially divided would naturally be united again. 87 To Nevel’skoi, the withdrawal of
the Cossacks in the seventeenth century was likewise a temporary separation. He considered it
his duty to reconcile the land with the Russian state.
In order to convince both the Russian state and its Far Eastern neighbors of Russia’s
historic right to the region, Nevel’skoi emphasized Russia’s historic position in the Amu region,
at times implying a firmer Russian hold on the Amur than had ever been the case. When he
raised a Russian flag at the mouth of the Amur in 1850, Nevel’skoi announced to indigenous
onlookers that Russians had always considered the land their own. To whalers from Europe and
North America, he spoke of the territory’s “prinadlezhnosti Rossii” (belonging to Russia), again
implying a natural connection or indivisibility, an inevitable belonging together. 88 In his
memoirs, Nevel’skoi highlighted evidence of Russia’s historic presence and influence in the
region: a Russian prayer book left behind by shipwrecked sailors, the ruins of a Russian fortress
at Albazin, and most importantly, indigenous inhabitants of Sakhalin Island who had dark blond
or brown hair and claimed Russian ancestry. 89
Departing from Ritter, who considered the region to have been legitimately ceded to
China in 1689, 90 both Nevel’skoi and Murav’ev emphasized in their correspondence with St.
Petersburg not only that Russians had historically been active in the region but also that Russia
had never, in fact, lost the north Amur basin. Since neither Russians nor Chinese had explored
the region and neither needed a distinct, fortified boundary, no exact borderline had ever been
defined. 91 Again emphasizing the role of water as a means of connection, Murav’ev wrote to
Menshikov in 1850, “Historical research on the eastern edges of Russia shows that throughout
the seventeenth century, Russian Cossacks and traders controlled the shores of the Sea of
Okhotsk, Kamchatka and the Amur River, and while we did not have a [Russian] population at
the mouth of the Amur, the Cossacks sailed down it and into the Sea of Okhotsk.” 92 The land had
been neglected by Russia, however, due to faulty maps that placed the border well to the north of
the river. 93 “By reproducing these inaccurate maps,” he explained, “it was as if we were
acknowledging that the area south of that arbitrarily drawn line belonged to China.” 94 To him, it
was high time to rectify that mistake.
Nevel’skoi likewise proclaimed a Russian past for Sakhalin Island, across the strait from
the Amur’s mouth, which had not been mentioned in the Treaty of Nerchinsk. When he
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established Murav’evskii Post on southern Sakhalin in 1853, Nevel’skoi insisted that Russia “has
and has always had a complete and irrefutable right” to the island. 95 Nevel’skoi justified Russian
activity there by explaining to the Japanese that the island had “belonged to Russia since time
immemorial.” 96 In an account of the landing written 13 years later, Nevel’skoi described himself
as claiming “Russia has always recognized Sakhalin as its own.” 97
To Nevel’skoi in the Amur region, as to Ritter’s Russian followers, not just the territory
of a preordained state was a single united entity, but the inhabitants of the land were destined for
unification. According to Ritter, more advanced civilizations, having achieved dominance thanks
to natural features such as rivers and coastlines, were morally obliged—indeed, ordained by
nature—to share their achievements. He notes that Europe had become “the place whence the
ripened fruits of civilization might be transferred to all other nations of the globe.” 98 As Baer
explained, “the convenience of [river] transportation united people into one nation and spreads
languages, so that even seemingly different nations soon merge into one.” 99 Russia, too, had a
history of sharing its civilization with its neighbors, emphasized Pogodin, elucidating Russian
history as a process of “undisputed takeover,…[a] loving deal” with its less accomplished
neighbors—in the words of Alexander Etkind, “colonization by consent.” 100 To Solov’ev, the
unity of the vast Russian empire was assured. “Thanks to the…ease of transportation and coming
together [provided by the Russian rivers],” Solov’ev wrote, applying Ritter’s ideas in a Russian
contest, “when nationalities [narodnosti] collide, they naturally and necessarily strive toward
sameness [priravnenie], merging one with another….Soon the entire plain is populated by a
single nation with one language, faith, law, and government.” 101 Yet Russia was not European,
Pogodin emphasized, noting both geographical and cultural disparities between the two. “We
have a different climate from the West…a different temperament, character, different blood, a
different physiognomy, a different outlook, a different cast of mind…different conditions,
different history….Everything is different.” 102
Likewise, Nevel’skoi emphasized that the indigenous people of the region desired to
become Russian. To him, declaring them Russian was not conquest but an act of brotherhood.
Throughout his reports, he described the indigenous peoples welcoming him, assisting him, and
petitioning him for protection. Nevel’skoi explained to Grand Duke Constantine in 1850:
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The Giliaks [Nivkhs]…helped us diligently, showing us fairways, storing our supplies.
Not only did they fail to show any displeasure that we were building among them, they in
contrast were glad and flocked to us to beg for protection from the tyranny of whalers
whose ships often visit their shores….They said to us: “We, Giliaks, just like our
kinsmen the Neidal’tsy, Negri, Samgery, and others living on the shores or the Amur,
Amgun and other rivers, live on one land [na odnoi zemle] with the Tungus. But you
protect the Tungus, and no one touches them. Why do you not want us to live like that as
well?”103
With that statement, Nevel’skoi not only indicated that the Nivkhs desired to submit to the
Russians but also attributed to Nivkhs themselves the idea of the land as a single united whole,
inhabited jointly by Nivkhs, Evenks, Neidal’tsy, and Russians. Its inhabitants were rodichi
(kinsmen) who belonged together. Sharing one land with the Russians, they wished to share the
protection of the Russian tsar, described by Pogodin as “peaceful guest [and] a desired
protector.” 104 According to Nevel’skoi, the Nivkhs themselves claimed a particular closeness to
the Russians, pointing out that “we do not hide our children from you or our wives” and
wondering why Russians did not reciprocate. 105
Nevel’skoi also emphasized the ability and presumed desire of the indigenous peoples to
adopt Russian culture. While Pogodin had asserted that all peoples of Russia would naturally
unite, and Solov’ev placed the assertion into a scientific framework, in the Amur region,
Nevel’skoi put this idea into practice, fulfilling the moral obligation granted to Russia by nature
itself. To him, the Nivkhs were not savage and deceptive, as explorer Ivan Kruzenshtern had
described them after his 1805 exploration. 106 Instead, they were destined to become one with the
Russians, a process that had already begun on Sakhalin, where a trader encountered villages
whose inhabitants exhibited Russian values and traits. 107 Nevel’skoi’s wife, Ekaterina
Nevel’skaia, furthered this process by teaching Nivkh women to bathe, comb their hair, garden,
and wear Russian clothes. 108 Nevel’skoi’s officer Nikolai Boshniak recalled that Nevel’skaia
invited her Nivkh guests inside and served them tea. 109 Boshniak himself sought to arrange the
marriage of a sailor under his command to the daughter of a wealthy Nivkh trader, cementing the
union of the peoples in another way. To his disappointment, the marriage never took place. 110
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While the 1860 Russo-Chinese border ran along the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, Nevel’skoi
was never satisfied with this arrangement. To Nevel’skoi—like Ritter—the Amur and Ussuri
Rivers were not borders but natural unifiers, representing a single unified whole. “The Amur and
Ussuri regions,” he claimed, referring not to the rivers alone, but to their entire watershed,
“represent a single indivisible whole, where the river and the sea constitute the only means of
transportation.” Arguing based on his own interpretation of the Treaty of Nerchinsk, he
continued, “the mouth of the Sungari River and the entire Ussuri River basin, all the way to the
Korean border, should constitute the inalienable property of Russia, all the more since the Amur
River alone represents only a base for our activities and does not determine the full significance
of the regions for Russia.” 111 Even after his return to St. Petersburg in 1855, he continued to
argue for the geographical unity of the entire region, including most of northern Manchuria. The
annexation of the Ussuri region in 1860 represented a compromise. 112 Yet future Russians would
indeed seek unification of Russia with Manchuria and even China itself. In the 1890s, the
Asianists (vostochniki) emphasized the Oriental roots of Russia, arguing for “reunification,”
while opposing the use of military force to attain it. Russia had no need to resort to force,
emphasized Prince Esper Ukhtomskii, a leading Asianist and tutor to the future Nicholas II. Fifty
years after Pogodin and Solov’ev made similar claims, Ukhtomskii wrote that “Russia in reality
conquers nothing in the East, since all the alien races visibly absorbed by her are related to us by
blood, in tradition, and in thought. We are only tightening the bonds between us and that which
in reality was already ours.” 113
Officially Russian
In 1853, after four years of exploration, declarations, and repeated justification of Nevel’skoi’s
insubordination, the Russian state revised its policy regarding the Amur River basin. Summoned
from Irkutsk to St. Petersburg in early 1853, Murav’ev again invoked Ritterian geography in
defense of Nevel’skoi’s actions, arguing that it was Russia’s destiny to occupy the Amur River
basin. “Some twenty-five years ago,” he declared, “the Russian American Company appealed to
the state for permission to occupy California,…expressing fear that the region would become a
trophy of the American United States. It has now been more than a year since California became
one of the North American states.” 114 This was not to be regretted, the Governor General
insisted, since it was natural for the United States to possess all of North America, just as Russia
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should naturally rule over the Asian shores of the Pacific. He continued: “Due to circumstances,
we have allowed the English to intrude into this part of Asia, [imposing] laws that do not serve
the good of mankind, but satisfy merely the commercial interests of Great Britain.” Yet it was
not for Britain, but for Russia, to occupy Sakhalin and the mouth of the Amur. 115 At a second
meeting that month (April 1853), Murav’ev shared with the tsar the conclusions of a surveying
expedition by topographer Nikolai Agte, who had spent three years exploring the Russo-Chinese
frontier. After considering the governor’s arguments and studying the topographer’s maps of the
region, the tsar finally accepted the Governor’s claim that the land had been Russian all along.
He ordered the Minister of War to approach China on the subject. 116 Not only had Nevel’skoi
accomplished his goal of attracting the state’s attention to the region, but he now had the tsar’s
wholehearted support. In the eyes of the state, the Amur was—and had long been—Russian.
Nevel’skoi’s dream of a river connection between Siberia and the Pacific became reality
in May 1854, when a flotilla of 78 boats transporting more than 800 Cossacks and soldiers
departed downriver from Siberia to defend the Russian borderland against Britain, France, and
the United States of America. Although the river took them through territory until recently
recognized as Chinese, they experienced no resistance. An encounter with indigenous Evenks in
possession of an engraved Russian dagger from the early 1700s and a day of rest at the ruins of
the Cossack fortress at Albazin seemed to confirm that the land was theirs, as did the friendly
welcome they allegedly received from the indigenous peoples as they neared the Pacific. Upon
reaching the region explored by Nevel’skoi’s Amur expedition, Murav’ev reported to the officer,
“We entered land that seems to have always belonged to Russia.” 117 Similar expeditions
followed the next two years. 118
In 1856, the region became part of the newly organized Primorskaia oblast’ of East
Siberia, the once-unauthorized Nikolaevskii Post founded by Nevel’skoi in 1850 serving as its
center. That summer, not only did troops sail down the river from Siberia, but peasants and
Cossacks also began arriving to settle the region. Once a remote wilderness separated from the
Russian heartland by mountains and forests, the region was becoming part of Russia itself.
Russia’s possession of the northern Amur basin became official with the 1858 Treaty of Aigun,
which placed the Russian-Chinese border along the Amur River, and by the 1860 Treaty of
Beijing, which granted to Russia the entire lower Amur basin east of the Ussuri. To many
Russians, the Amur provided hope in Russia’s national greatness and future abundance. 119
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Conclusion
In an era of imperialism, when European states were fighting for land and influence around the
globe, Baron August von Haxthausen seems to have contradicted himself when he predicted a
“great future destiny” for Russia, while warning that it must not become a “conquering
power.” 120 Historically, great nations had conquered, and in the mid-nineteenth century, they
demonstrated their superiority through colonization, which granted them land, resources,
subjects, and prestige. To followers of geographer Karl Ritter, however, there was no
contradiction in this statement. Some states, Ritter claimed, were predestined to be large and
strong, which they achieved not through war, but by integrating land and peoples that belonged
naturally together. A nation’s true boundaries, according to Ritter’s teaching, were determined
by natural features such as rivers, which united peoples and facilitated population movement,
and mountains, which often created divisions.
Ritter’s ideas shed light on an apparent paradox in the language and actions of Gennadii
Nevel’skoi concerning the Amur River basin in the mid-nineteenth century. In less than a
decade, facing regular opposition from the tsar’s ministers, Nevel’skoi spearheaded Russia’s
annexation of more than 900,000 km2, a land with rich potential for agriculture and of
geopolitical significance to the state. Moreover, the annexation opened up shipping on the Amur
River itself, facilitating transport of people and goods from the heart of Siberia. Yet language of
conquest and imperialism is conspicuously missing in the writings of Nevel’skoi. Not once in his
424-page memoir—outside of quotations and official titles—did Nevel’skoi refer to Russia as an
empire. The word imperiia in Nevel’skoi’s writing was used in reference to the empires of the
Japanese and the Qing, while the Russian empire was the fatherland (otechestvo), or simply
Russia (Rossiia) itself. Nevel’skoi did not speak of conquest, but of prisoedinenie—literally
fastening together or counting as one—and of vodvorenie, or settlement of land that was already
Russian. 121 Defending his friend’s actions, the Governor General—himself an official in charge
of a large colonial possession—argued not for the expansion of Russian borders but for
recognition of territory that had been Russia’s all long. The tsar, it is reported, was convinced,
responding “Itak eto nashe!” (So it’s ours) and taking measures to rectify the situation. 122
The geographic theories of Karl Ritter reached far beyond the realm of European
intellectuals and Russian intelligentsia, their Russian variations evident even in the expansion of
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Russia in the East. Despite the disapproval of a conservative Russian state, Nevel’skoi’s Amur
Expedition of 1849–1853 put into practice Solov’ev’s theory that Russia’s gosudarstvennaia
oblast’ (state territory) developed historically along the vast river systems of Russia, fulfilling
Ritter’s hope that one day scholars would “determine from the whole of a nation’s surroundings
what the course of its development is [best] to be.” 123 While Russia’s actions in the Far East
conformed to patterns of colonialism around the globe, the discourse surrounding them was of a
natural, rightful, and historic Russian land. Within an intellectual context shaped in part by
Ritterian geography, Nevel’skoi could colonize without considering himself a colonizer, expand
the empire while arguing that the region was Russia’s all along.
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